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THE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL CANON
Tom Donnelly*
ABSTRACT
Popular constitutionalism scholarship has often left out the American people.
Sure, ordinary citizens make cameo appearances—often through the actions of
elected officials and elite movement leaders. However, focusing on high politics
among elite actors—even if those actors are not judges—simply is not enough. If
popular constitutional views do, indeed, matter, then we can expect constitutional
partisans to try to manipulate the processes through which these views emerge.
Some constitutional scholars have made a start, reflecting on the importance of the
constitutional canon. However, these scholars focus mostly on the legal canon and
often ignore its popular analog. At the same time, other scholars have worked to
bring the American people back into constitutional theory by studying the constitu-
tional views of ordinary Americans and explaining the ways in which key social
movements shape constitutional doctrine. These scholars, however, have largely
ignored the pathways of constitutional socialization—the ways in which citizens
learn about the Constitution. An important part of this neglected project is tending
to the set of stock stories transmitted by key institutions to ordinary citizens—in
other words, tending to the popular constitutional canon. In this Article, I turn to one
site of constitutional socialization—American public schools. This visit to our Na-
tion’s classrooms highlights the various ways in which the lessons that we are teaching
our schoolchildren undermine popular sovereignty, through mythologizing the
Supreme Court, promoting “Founder worship,” and downplaying the constitutional
achievements of successive generations. In the end, if public opinion matters to
constitutional doctrine and reform, as many scholars argue, then these sites of con-
stitutional socialization are worth studying.
* Alpheus Thomas Mason Prize Fellow, Princeton University; Climenko Fellow and
Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, 2010–12; JD, Yale Law School, 2009; BA, Georgetown
University, 2003. This Article arises from years of research, reflection, and conversation span-
ning a range of institutions and organizations, including Yale Law School, Harvard Law School,
the Constitutional Accountability Center, the National Constitution Center, and Princeton Uni-
versity. For their suggestions, encouragement, and inspiration at various stages, I extend my
deep thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Richard Albert, Andrew Bradt, Stella Burch
Elias, Desmond Jagmohan, Michael Klarman, Stephen Macedo, Robert Post, Jeffrey Rosen,
Reva Siegel, Steven Teles, Susannah Barton Tobin, and Keith Whittington.
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INTRODUCTION
Popular constitutionalism began as a call to action. Richard Parker extolled the
virtues of majority rule and popular constitutional values.1 Mark Tushnet sought to
abolish judicial review.2 Jeremy Waldron defended legislative supremacy.3 And Larry
Kramer, in his pioneering work, The People Themselves, drew on constitutional his-
tory to call for an end to judicial supremacy and a return to the American tradition
of popular constitutionalism—one that combined popular assertions of constitutional
meaning with a commitment to realizing those popular views within our constitu-
tional system, whether through elections and ordinary politics, or blunt curbs on
judicial power like court-packing and jurisdiction-stripping.4
1 RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE”: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANI-
FESTO 3–5 (1994).
2 MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
3 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346,
1351–53 (2006).
4 See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 5, 7–8 (2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES]; Larry Kramer,
Generating Constitutional Meaning, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1439 (2006) [hereinafter Kramer,
Generating Constitutional Meaning]; Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173
(2006); Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitution-
alism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697 (2006); Larry D.
Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343 (2005); Larry D. Kramer,
The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001).
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While critics have long attacked popular constitutionalism as lacking a clear
definition or a concrete (or, at minimum, realistic) reform agenda,5 Kramer did offer
a sweeping constitutional vision:
[T]o control the Supreme Court, we must first lay claim to the
Constitution ourselves. That means publicly repudiating Justices
who say that they, not we, possess ultimate authority to say what
the Constitution means. It means publicly reprimanding politi-
cians who insist that “as Americans” we should submissively
yield to whatever the Supreme Court decides. It means refusing
to be deflected by arguments that constitutional law is too com-
plex or difficult for ordinary citizens. . . . Above all, it means
insisting that the Supreme Court is our servant and not our
master: a servant whose seriousness and knowledge deserves
much deference, but who is ultimately supposed to yield to our
judgments about what the Constitution means and not the re-
verse. The Supreme Court is not the highest authority in the land
on constitutional law. We are.6
Kramer’s vision demanded a citizenry prepared to assume constitutional re-
sponsibility.7 However, Kramer and his popular constitutionalist compatriots have
spent precious little time studying the institutions and other forces that shape the
constitutional views of the average citizen.8
5 See Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1594, 1595 (2005); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils
of Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 676; Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law
Back in Constitutional Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 461, 463 (2009). For terrific explorations
of the universe of popular constitutionalism research, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CON-
STITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 3–18 (2007); and David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections
as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2053–64 (2010).
6 KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 4, at 247–48.
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN
UNJUST WORLD (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION]; DAVID W.
BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2001); MICHAEL
KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CUL-
TURE (1986); Jack M. Balkin, The Distribution of Political Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 1144 (2012)
[hereinafter Balkin, Distribution of Political Faith]; Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings:
Emotion, Commitment, and Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623
(2009); Jamin B. Raskin, The Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project: American
Legal Education’s Ambitious Experiment in Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 DENV. U. L.
REV. 833 (2013); Christopher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 193 (2011).
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At the same time, a different strand of popular constitutionalism—more descrip-
tive than normative—sought to understand the relationship between public opinion
and constitutional doctrine.9 This scholarship grew out of the legal academy’s decades-
long obsession with the countermajoritarian difficulty.10 While popular constitution-
alist scholars like Kramer offer normative theories that attack judicial authority,11
another set of scholars has decided to play a different game. Rather than churning
out grand theories designed to legitimize or attack judicial review,12 this new gen-
eration aims to prove that the countermajoritarian difficulty is no difficulty at all.13
While not all of these scholars self-identify as popular constitutionalists, their schol-
arship establishes that constitutional doctrine, far from imposing the views of an out-
of-touch legal elite on the general public, tends to track public opinion—particularly
in the areas where the public cares most.14 These scholars have devoted most of their
time to working out the large-scale processes that produce this result—and to great
avail; the proposition that constitutional doctrine tracks public opinion in high-salience
cases is now the conventional wisdom among constitutional scholars.15
9 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLU-
ENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 16–18 (2009).
10 See, e.g., id. at 5–7.
11 See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 4, at 7–8.
12 See, e.g., J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERI-
CANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 22 (2012).
13 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 14–15.
14 See id. at 374–75; JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE
COURTS SERVE AMERICA 3–5 (2006); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1738, 1750–51 (2007) [hereinafter Ackerman, Living Constitution]; Jack M. Balkin,
Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 550 (2009);
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1045, 1049–51 (2001); Peter K. Enns & Patrick C. Wohlfarth, The Swing Justice, 75
J. POL. 1089, 1103 (2013); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2596, 2598–600 (2003); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The
Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 497–501 (1997); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking
the History of American Freedom, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 265, 271–72 (2000); Michael
J. Klarman, What’s So Great about Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 145–46 (1998);
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020,
at 25–29 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1946–47 (2003); Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L.
REV. 1027, 1027–29 (2004); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Consti-
tutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373–76 (2007); Robert C.
Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7–9 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324–29 (2006); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial
Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 860–61 (2009).
15 See, e.g., Andrew B. Coan, Well, Should They?: A Response to If People Would Be
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Much like Kramer’s normative theory, these descriptive accounts rely on the
American people.16 However, for these descriptive scholars, public opinion often
serves as an invisible hand of sorts, guiding constitutional doctrine most of the time
and only becoming a blunt force when doctrine strays too far from consensus con-
stitutional views.17 Even so, as with Kramer’s account, this descriptive scholarship
tends to focus on constitutional history—particularly the elite conflicts that have
spurred constitutional change.18
In short, popular constitutionalism—both normative and descriptive—often leaves
out the American people. Sure, ordinary citizens make cameo appearances, often
through the actions of elected officials and elite movement leaders. However, for
those interested in promoting popular sovereignty, focusing on high politics among
elite actors—even if those actors are not judges—simply is not enough. Popular con-
stitutionalism must not ignore the American people and the institutions that shape
popular constitutional views.
This oversight is troubling because if popular constitutional views do, indeed, mat-
ter, then we can expect constitutional partisans to attempt to manipulate the processes
through which these views emerge.19 And, in our age of heightened polarization,20
when large-scale change at the national level through our cumbersome legislative
process is all but impossible, constitutional partisans may seek change within smaller-
scale institutions that have an outsized influence. It is up to the next generation of
popular constitutionalists to pay attention to these microlevel processes and shift the
field’s focus from the realm of nonjudicial elites to the constitutional experiences
of ordinary citizens and the processes shaping their constitutional views.21
Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 213, 238 (2007) (arguing
that popular constitutionalism “has taken constitutional theory by storm”). But see Lawrence
Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares about Elites, Not the American People,
98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1516 (2010) (contending that elite opinion is more important to Supreme
Court decision-making than public opinion); Justin Driver, The Consensus Constitution, 89
TEX. L. REV. 755, 757–58 (2011) (complicating the relationship between public opinion and
Supreme Court decision-making).
16 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 367–68.
17 See, e.g., id. at 383 (“Over time, sometimes a long period, public opinion jells, and the
Court comes into line with the considered views of the American public.”). The Lochner era,
and the New Deal settlement, is the paradigm example. Id. at 4.
18 See, e.g., id. at 12–13.
19 This was especially true during the Obama years, when the Tea Party, a movement
committed to constitutional education, was on the rise. See Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party
Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 827, 839, 859–60 (2011);
Schmidt, supra note 8, at 194–95, 215–17.
20 See, e.g., NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY
AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2d ed. 2016).
21 Popular constitutionalism scholarship should build on Michael Kammen’s ground-
breaking work decades ago on the Constitution in American culture. See KAMMEN, supra
note 8. Here is how Kammen describes his project:
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Of course, some constitutional scholars have made a start, reflecting on the im-
portance of the constitutional canon and some of its pathologies.22 Yet, even these
scholars tend to focus on the legal canon and ignore its popular analog. Consequently,
their treatment of the legal canon itself is often theoretical and normative—leaving
important descriptive work to others.23
At the same time, some scholars have worked to bring the American people
back into constitutional theory by studying the constitutional views of ordinary
Americans24 and explaining the ways in which key social movements shape constitu-
tional doctrine.25 However, even these scholars have largely ignored the pathways
of what I call constitutional socialization—the ways in which citizens learn about
the Constitution. An important part of this neglected project is tending to the set of
stock stories transmitted by key institutions (like our public schools and national
shrines) to ordinary citizens—in other words, tending to what I refer to as the popular
constitutional canon. If public opinion matters to constitutional doctrine—as many
scholars argue—then these sites of constitutional socialization are worth studying.
This is especially true in a constitutional tradition like ours which is rooted in popular
sovereignty with a Founding story premised on constitutional reform driven by
public “reflection and choice.”26
Although a vast literature exists in the traditional field of constitutional
history—including works on the Supreme Court, biographies of justices,
so-called biographies of the Constitution, and pertinent aspects of Ameri-
can legal history—no one has attempted to describe the place of the
Constitution in the public consciousness and symbolic life of the Amer-
ican people[,] . . . by which I mean the perceptions and misperceptions,
uses and abuses, knowledge and ignorance of ordinary Americans.
Id. at xi.
22 See, e.g., 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS]; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTI-
TUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, UNWRIT-
TEN CONSTITUTION]; J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,
111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Canons of Constitutional
Law]; Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011); Jill Elaine Hasday,
Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional Canon, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1715; Richard A.
Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998); Mark Tushnet,
The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 187 (2000).
23 Looking ahead, future scholars should build on this literature and work to understand the
constitutional stories that we enshrine in our casebooks, teach in our law school classrooms,
and impart to young lawyers in the legal profession. These lessons, and the constitutional
norms that they instill, are the foundation of our legal culture.
24 See, e.g., PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 3 (Nathaniel Persily,
Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008); Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen
Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 356, 358–60 (2011).
25 See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 8.
26 THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert A. Ferguson ed., 2006).
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In Part I, I define what I mean by the constitutional canon and offer a prelimi-
nary account of constitutional socialization. To that end, I draw on legal scholarship
on the constitutional canon and the existing literature on political socialization27 and
social norms.28 In Parts II, III, and IV, I explore the possible normative payoff of
tending to the constitutional canon. In Part II, I consider its role in the legal profession,
engaging extensively with Bruce Ackerman’s works. His reflections on the constitu-
tional canon are the most comprehensive in recent literature and begin to bridge the
legal and the popular. For Ackerman, the constitutional canon plays a central role
in his larger project—one designed to valorize popular sovereignty while also preserv-
ing the past achievements of the American people.29 For Ackerman, the stories that
lawyers tell each other (and the rest of us) about our legal tradition matter.30
In Parts III and IV, I turn to the popular constitutional canon and one site of con-
stitutional socialization: American public schools. These Parts draw on my previous
work on how America’s leading textbooks have taught the American constitutional
tradition over time.31 While this work was largely descriptive, my treatment here
attempts to synthesize some of the lessons that arise from those previous descriptive
accounts. Public schools—and America’s leading high-school textbooks—are a core
way in which we define and transmit the popular constitutional canon to the Ameri-
can people.32 This visit to our Nation’s classrooms highlights the various ways in
which the lessons that we are teaching our schoolchildren undermine popular sov-
ereignty, including mythologizing the Supreme Court, promoting “Founder wor-
ship,” and downplaying the constitutional achievements of successive generations.33
For those who are committed to promoting popular sovereignty, these lessons should
be unnerving. Finally, in Part V, I suggest avenues for future research.
27 See, e.g., ROBERT S. ERIKSON & KENT L. TEDIN, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION (8th ed.
2011); DONALD GREEN, BRADLEY PALMQUIST & ERIC SCHICKLER, PARTISAN HEARTS AND
MINDS: POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS (2002). Of course,
political socialization and constitutionalism may differ in important ways. Nevertheless, if
the importance of early learning holds true in politics—a topic that touches each citizen’s life
in important ways throughout her life cycle—it is reasonable to believe that the same may
be true of constitutional socialization, an area more removed from one’s daily routine.
28 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
29 ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 7–35, 121, 224, 311–40.
30 See id. at 314; see also Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 14, at 1809.
31 See Tom Donnelly, A Popular Approach to Popular Constitutionalism: The First
Amendment, Civic Education, and Constitutional Change, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 321 (2010)
[hereinafter Donnelly, A Popular Approach]; Tom Donnelly, Our Forgotten Founders: Re-
construction, Public Education, and Constitutional Heroism, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115 (2010)
[hereinafter Donnelly, Forgotten Founders]; Tom Donnelly, Note, Popular Constitutionalism,
Civic Education, and the Stories We Tell Our Children, 118 YALE L.J. 948 (2009) [herein-
after Donnelly, Stories We Tell].
32 Donnelly, A Popular Approach, supra note 31, at 335–36.
33 See generally Donnelly, Forgotten Founders, supra note 31; Donnelly, Stories We
Tell, supra note 31.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANON, CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS, AND THE
PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIALIZATION
Lawyers occupy important positions of power—in our communities, in our state
and local governments, in Congress, in our Executive branch, and in our courts. Legal
culture often filters down to ordinary citizens, most notably through the stories that
we tell about our Constitution and its history. Scholars often refer to these core
constitutional norms, lessons, and narratives as our Nation’s constitutional canon.34
A. Defining the Constitutional Canon
The constitutional canon is the set of cases, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education;35
Supreme Court dissents, e.g., Justice John Marshall Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson;36 statutes, e.g., the Voting Rights Act of 1965; speeches, e.g., the Gettys-
burg Address; documents, e.g., the Declaration of Independence; narratives, e.g., the
battle over President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan; and constitu-
tional provisions, e.g., “equal protection of the laws,” that have earned a privileged
place in the American constitutional tradition.37 To date, legal scholars have mostly
studied the constitutional canon as it relates to the legal profession itself.38
In their classic account, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson argue that “there is
no better way to understand a discipline—its underlying assumptions, its current
concerns and anxieties—than to study what its members think is canonical . . . .”39
For Balkin and Levinson, such studies help unearth “the secrets of a culture and its
characteristic modes of thought.”40 Within the legal community, the process of
canonization is often driven by questions like (1) which texts should “appear in
contemporary constitutional law casebooks”; (2) which texts should “American law
students study and discuss, which should educated citizens know about, and which
should inform the work of legal academics”; and (3) which texts should “form part
of the ‘canon’ of American legal materials?”41
Mark Tushnet defines the constitutional canon as the “set of themes that orga-
nize the way in which people think about [constitutional law].”42 Richard Primus
describes it as “a set of greatly authoritative texts that above all others shape the
34 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 22, at 187–91.
35 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 121; AMAR,
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 22, at 245–47; Balkin & Levinson, Canons of Con-
stitutional Law, supra note 22, at 987; Greene, supra note 22, at 380–81, 475; Hasday, supra
note 22, at 1716–17; Primus, supra note 22, at 243–46; Tushnet, supra note 22, at 187.
38 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 22, at 380–82; Primus, supra note 22, at 243–52.
39 Balkin & Levinson, Canons of Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 968.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 967–68.
42 Tushnet, supra note 22, at 187.
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nature and development of constitutional law.”43 Jamal Greene sees it covering “the
set of decisions whose correctness participants in constitutional argument must always
assume.”44 In other words, a case like Brown is canonical because “all legitimate
constitutional decisions must be consistent with Brown’s rightness, and all credible
theories of constitutional interpretation must accommodate the decision.”45
The constitutional canon also includes anti-canonical examples.46 Greene describes
this “anti-canon” as a collection of cases that “embodies a set of propositions that all
legitimate constitutional decisions must be prepared to refute.”47 For Greene, these
cases emerge not simply because of notable defects in their legal reasoning (although
each contains some), but instead from “the attitude the constitutional interpretive
community takes toward the ethical propositions that the decision has come to
represent, and the susceptibility of the decision to use as an antiprecedent.”48 Primus
adds that these cases are “the most reviled ones” in the field—cases like Dred Scott
v. Sandford 49 and Plessy v. Ferguson.50 A key feature of the anti-canon is that the
interpretive community often canonizes the key dissent in the anti-canonical case, with
courts often treating these dissents “as if they were legally authoritative precedents.”51
At the same time, for Balkin and Levinson, there is no single constitutional canon;
instead, the question of canonicity turns on context and depends “on the audience
for whom and the purposes for which the canon is constructed.”52 When it comes to
the constitutional canon, this means that certain norms, texts, cases, and narratives
“can be canonical because they are important for educating law students, because
they ensure a necessary cultural literacy for citizens in a democracy, or because they
serve as benchmarks for testing academic theories.”53
Building on Balkin and Levinson’s insight, the constitutional canon has many dif-
ferent components and functions—both legal and popular.54 The canon includes the
body of materials at the heart of legal education, including the collection of cases, aca-
demic theories, and slivers of constitutional text that law professors seek to transmit
to the next generation of lawyers.55 This has been the main focus of constitutional
43 Primus, supra note 22, at 243.
44 Greene, supra note 22, at 381.
45 Id.
46 See id.
47 Id. at 380.
48 Id. at 381.
49 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
50 Primus, supra note 22, at 245.
51 Id. at 246. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy is an example. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 552–64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
52 Balkin & Levinson, Canons of Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 970.
53 Id.
54 See Balkin & Levinson, Canons of Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 970, 976,
980–81; see also Greene, supra note 22, at 383; Tushnet, supra note 22, at 194.
55 See Balkin & Levinson, Canons of Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 970, 973–74,
977.
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scholars to date—with these accounts focusing mostly on leading casebooks, Supreme
Court confirmation hearings, and Supreme Court citations.56 However, the constitu-
tional canon also includes popular components—for instance, the parts of our constitu-
tional tradition at the core of American citizenship, including the set of constitutional
stories that our public schools impart to our schoolchildren, the roster of shrines that
the National Park Service preserves for large groups of visitors, and the snippets of
constitutional knowledge that our government transmits to new immigrants seeking
naturalization.57 These sites merit attention from constitutional scholars as well.
B. Social Norms, Constitutional Socialization, and the Influence of the
Constitutional Canon
The constitutional canon is a means of transmitting constitutional norms, texts,
cases, and narratives to both lawyers and ordinary citizens.58 The literature on poli-
tical socialization and social norms offers several insights into how this process of
constitutional socialization might work.59
The socialization literature suggests a standard political life cycle for most
citizens—one that might be adapted for the purposes of building a model of constitu-
tional socialization.60 Early in life, people are quite receptive to new lessons—whether
from parents,61 teachers,62 friends,63 the mass media,64 or historic events65—with our
most impressionable years occurring between the ages of seventeen and twenty-six.66
56 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 22, at 383.
57 See Balkin & Levinson, Canons of Constitutional Law, supra note 22, at 970, 976–78,
987; Primus, supra note 22, at 243.
58 See Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 951.
59 See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
60 See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
61 See ERIKSON & TEDIN, supra note 27, at 129; GREEN, PALMQUIST & SCHICKLER, supra
note 27, at 4; Amy Linimon & Mark R. Joslyn, Trickle Up Political Socialization: The Impact
of Kids Voting USA on Voter Turnout in Kansas, 2 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 24, 26 (2002).
62 See ERIKSON & TEDIN, supra note 27, at 135; Lee H. Ehman, The American School in
the Political Socialization Process, 50 REV. EDUC. RES. 99, 101–03 (1980); William A.
Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education, 4 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 217, 232 (2001); Josh Pasek et al., Schools as Incubators of Democratic Participation:
Building Long-Term Political Efficacy with Civic Education, 12 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL
SCI. 26, 26–27 (2008); Judith Torney-Purta, The School’s Role in Developing Civic Engage-
ment: A Study of Adolescents in Twenty-Eight Countries, 6 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI.
203, 203 (2002); Joel Westheimer & Joseph Kahne, What Kind of Citizen? The Politics of
Educating for Democracy, 41 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 237, 263 (2004).
63 See ERIKSON & TEDIN, supra note 27, at 134; GREEN, PALMQUIST & SCHICKLER, supra
note 27, at 3–4.
64 See Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Estimating the Causal Effects of Media Coverage on
Policy-Specific Knowledge, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 73, 74 (2009); Linimon & Joslyn, supra note
61, at 27.
65 See ERIKSON & TEDIN, supra note 27, at 147.
66 See id. at 157.
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However, by our late twenties, our views harden.67 And moving forward, we live out
the rest of our lives with a relatively fixed worldview, reading new events through
the prism of our previously formed (often partisan) views.68 While our opinions on
the issues of the day may change and our trust in government may fluctuate, broader
values like ideology and party identification remain fairly stable.69 And those values,
as well as the elite messengers associated with our chosen ideology and party, often
greatly influence our views on specific issues.70
To be clear, adulthood is not a period of complete stasis, as cataclysmic events—
e.g., the Great Depression; shifts in the orthodoxy of our chosen political party, e.g.,
a new embrace of civil rights laws; trends in wider societal opinion, e.g., growing
support for marriage equality; and big changes in our personal lives, e.g., a move,
a new job, or a new love interest—may alter our views in ways both large and small.71
Over time, the Supreme Court decides new cases,72 presidents deliver new Inaugural
and State of the Union Addresses,73 political candidates embrace new constitutional
rhetoric on the campaign trail,74 and the American people (and legal elites) embrace
novel constitutional claims.75 While the public’s opinions may change on the issues
of the day—like immigration or health care—and its trust in government may fluc-
tuate, broader values like ideology, party identification, and even racial attitudes
tend to harden over time.76 In short, the overall process of socialization never really
ends—it simply slows down. These patterns of socialization affect both lawyers and
ordinary citizens.77
One key method of political, and, speculatively, constitutional, socialization is
the cultivation of social norms.78 Cass Sunstein defines social norms as “social at-
titudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what
67 Id.
68 Id. at 146.
69 See id. at 155.
70 See GREEN, PALMQUIST & SCHICKLER, supra note 27, at 4; Joseph Bafumi & Robert
Y. Shapiro, A New Partisan Voter, 71 J. POL. 1, 3 (2009).
71 See ERIKSON & TEDIN, supra note 27, at 147, 156; GREEN, PALMQUIST & SCHICKLER,
supra note 27, at 4–6, 87; Bafumi & Shapiro, supra note 70, at 3.
72 Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1207, 1216 (2010).
73 Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837
(2009).
74 ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE CONSTITUTION ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: THE SURPRISING
POLITICAL CAREER OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING DOCUMENT 4–8 (2007).
75 JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 294 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGI-
NALISM]; Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 197,
198–99 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt,
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (2013).
76 See, e.g., ERIKSON & TEDIN, supra note 27, at 155.
77 See Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 14, at 1809; Lessig, supra note 28, at 956.
78 Sunstein, supra note 28, at 910.
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ought not to be done.”79 For Sunstein, social norms are “enforced through social
sanctions”—in other words, by attaching costs or benefits to a given choice.80 They
shape the choices that people make each day—whether at the office, at home, or on
the bus. They help us determine how to value certain choices over others, shape the
reputational costs and benefits of a given choice, and influence how a given choice
might affect our own conception of ourselves.81 In short, they help us “assign ‘social
meaning’ to human behavior.”82
Lawrence Lessig defines social meaning as “the semiotic content attached to
various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context.”83 These meanings
are shaped by “a particular society or group or community within which social mean-
ings occur,” and they “empower or constrain individuals.”84 Even as these social
meanings shape many of our most important choices, we have little control over
them.85 Instead, they are often shaped by the larger community—whether that is one’s
profession, constitutional culture, society, faith community, or political party—or, at
times, by government policy (e.g., laws, court rulings, public education policy, etc.).86
In the context of the constitutional canon, legal scholars should tend to the
processes through which the “orthodox gets made—by whom, and with what
techniques”—whether that is the legal profession shaping the lessons taught to
future lawyers in law schools or the government shaping the lessons that are taught
to schoolchildren in public schools.87 As in other contexts, our individual choices
as lawyers and citizens within our constitutional culture is often “a function of . . .
governing norms, meanings, and roles”—“an unruly amalgam of . . . aspirations,
tastes, physical states, responses to existing roles and norms, values, judgments, emo-
tions, drives, beliefs, whims.”88 These norms and meanings can be “intensely role-spe-
cific,” with “people’s conception of appropriate action and even of their ‘interest’ . . .
very much a function of the particular social role in which they find themselves.”89
These roles may be defined by the norms of a given profession or community.90
79 Id. at 914.
80 Id. at 915.
81 Id. at 910. See also TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES: THE SOCIAL CONSE-
QUENCES OF FALSIFICATION 26–35 (1995) (distinguishing between “intrinsic utility, reputational
utility, and expressive utility”).
82 Sunstein, supra note 28, at 925.
83 Lessig, supra note 28, at 951.
84 Id. at 952, 955.
85 Sunstein, supra note 28, at 911.
86 Id. at 913–14 (providing examples of social norms).
87 Lessig, supra note 28, at 948.
88 Sunstein, supra note 28, at 913, 967.
89 Id. at 911–12, 921.
90 See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR (2006) (exploring how different audiences and legal communities influence judicial
behavior); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) [hereinafter LEVINSON,
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Take a lawyer, for instance. Her choices as a member of the legal profession—
even as a lawyer acting in a non-legal context—are shaped by the professional
norms of legal culture—norms that may be imparted to her through her training in
law school, through the process of ongoing professional socialization in her capacity
as a lawyer in practice, and through any large-scale changes in the law or in profes-
sional practice (whether through court decisions in her area of expertise, influential
academic works, new statutes or professional regulations, new ethical rules, etc.).
These norms will influence the choices that she makes as a lawyer in practice,
whether it is the advice that she gives to a client or the arguments that she makes in
a court filing. However, they may also affect the choices that she makes outside of
her official scope of practice, for instance, as an elected official or as a candidate
running for office. Her professional culture inculcates certain personal traits appro-
priate to her profession, whether that be argumentativeness and competitiveness on
the one hand, or disinterestedness and civic-republican virtue on the other hand.91
In each case, the norms of her profession (or of her preferred norm community
within that profession) informs what it means to be a well-trained and well-socialized
lawyer within her legal community and shapes the choices that she makes.92
Certain constitutional norms and conventions may be especially important in the
context of the U.S. Constitution—an old document filled with vague language with
many gaps subject to interpretation and construction.93 While the Constitution dis-
tributes power to different actors and institutions, constitutional conventions, shaped
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH] (explaining how different legal communities make different claims
on the Constitution); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:
THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008) (describing how the progressive and conserva-
tive legal communities created their own distinct legal universes, with their own professional
networks, legal organizations, and ways of creating professional incentives and disincentives).
91 For historical treatment of these visions of the legal profession, see Robert W. Gordon,
The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); R. Kent Newmyer, Harvard Law
School, New England Legal Culture, and the Antebellum Origins of American Jurisprudence,
in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE (David Thelen ed., 1988); and Norman W.
Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the Ideology of Antebellum Legal
Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2003).
92 For an extended account of how this might influence judicial behavior, see BAUM, supra
note 90.
93 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 108 (2010) (noting that many significant parts of the Constitution’s text are
“general, abstract, and vague”). For additional accounts of the interpretation-construction
divide, see BALKIN, LIVING ORGINIALISM, supra note 75; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Lawrence
B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409 (2009);
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453
(2018); and Keith Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
375 (2013).
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by constitutional practice over time, often influence how and when formal powers
may be exercised.94 As Keith Whittington explains, these conventions may “resolve
apparent indeterminacies in constitutional meaning, settling potential disputes and
allowing governance to proceed,” or they may “narrow the apparent discretion in the
exercise of political power that might otherwise fall to government officials, elabo-
rating supplemental rules that limit political options.”95 These conventions are “backed
by threats of ostracism, censure, reprisal, and the breakdown of cooperation . . . .”96
Whittington gives the classic example of the two-term President, derived from
President George Washington’s example and subsequent practice, but these conven-
tions may go to other key choices within our constitutional culture among lawyers
and non-lawyers alike.97 They may guide a Senator determining whether to reach a
compromise with her opponents on a key issue or to start a fight; a reform commu-
nity determining whether to push for conventional political action, litigation, or a
constitutional amendment; or an individual citizen determining whether to support
a new constitutional amendment or leave the constitutional text as it is, whether in
deference to the Founders’s wisdom, in anticipation of a new constitutional con-
struction by the courts, or as a result of substantive support for the existing Constitu-
tion.98 These conventions may also influence whether an individual citizen, reform
community, or elected official may support efforts to check the Supreme Court after
one or more adverse constitutional rulings through blunt court-curbing measures like
jurisdiction-stripping and court-packing, for example. These questions of political
practice, interpretive authority, and constitutional reform are often shaped by the
norms, meanings, and conventions advanced within our constitutional community.99
Importantly, these norms, meanings, and conventions are often transmitted
through education—whether through public schools, law schools, or professional
development.100 For the purposes of this Article, I refer to this process as “constitu-
tional socialization.” In one of Lessig’s key insights, he explains that the power of
social meanings often “rest[s] upon a certain uncontested, or taken-for-granted,
background of thought or expectation . . . that though constructed, their force
depends upon them not seeming constructed.”101 Their power rests precisely when
they “become uncontested and invisible, . . . appear[ing] natural, or necessary.”102
94 See Keith E. Whittington, The Status of Unwritten Constitutional Conventions in the
United States, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1854–55.
95 Id. at 1858.
96 Id. at 1863.
97 Id. at 1855.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 See Lessig, supra note 28, at 976.
101 Id. at 951.
102 Id. at 960.
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Consider constitutional education in our schools.103 For Lessig, our public
schools are the one “institution most clearly . . . dedicated to the construction of certain
types of people, through subtle and important coercion, dependent upon the invisi-
bility of this very same coercion.”104 School lessons are transmitted in the classroom
by textbooks and teachers, who enforce the “right” answer to a given question or the
“right” behavior in a given situation.105 However, “this coercion is only effective to
the extent that it is understood or seen as something other than coercion.”106 For
Lessig, these key features “are the components of a machine that constructs a certain
world for the children it touches and constructs citizens out of these children.”107
We can see this process at work in how American history is taught to students in
public school classrooms. While history is a contested field, the version transmitted
in our schools through curricula, textbooks, lesson plans, and classroom instruction
often takes the form of uncontested orthodoxy. This version is necessarily selective,
103 See K. Royal & Darra L. Hofman, Impaneled and Ineffective: The Role of Law Schools
and Constitutional Literacy Programs in Effective Jury Reform, 90 DENV. L. REV. 959, 969
(2013).
104 Lessig, supra note 28, at 976. See also J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY
OF IDEOLOGY 85–88 (1998) [hereinafter BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE] (describing the role
that “institutionalized” storytelling plays in entrenching cultural values); STEPHEN M. CALIENDO,
TEACHERS MATTER: THE TROUBLE WITH LEAVING POLITICAL EDUCATION TO THE COACHES
18–19 (2000) (explaining the long-term effects of constitutional education in our public schools
on the constitutional perception of ordinary citizens); Alice Garrett, Teaching High School
History Inside and Outside the Historical Canon, in LEARNING HISTORY IN AMERICA: SCHOOLS,
CULTURES, AND POLITICS 71, 72 (Lloyd Kramer et al. eds., 1994) (explaining that Americans
may not learn much about American history or America’s constitutional system after gradu-
ating from high school); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 157 (1995) (arguing that the American people have long expected high
schools to play a key role in advancing “cultural literacy” and cultural attachment).
105 ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE & REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE 6
(2008); Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
641, 672–74, 680–81 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, New Originalism]; Gewirtzman, supra note
8, at 656 (“These [cultural] scripts are often transmitted and reinforced through . . . archetypal
narratives.”). These canonical accounts are designed to, at the very least, “preserve cultural
content and cultural identity.” BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE, supra note 104, at 90. At the
same time, they often succeed in promoting “an emotional attachment to the polity”—one
which tends to “encourage[ ] citizens to behave toward their country and its citizens as they
do toward their families: proud, protective, and willing to make sacrifices.” Sherry, supra
note 104, at 162. Recent studies confirm that, “[w]hile many Americans remain ill-informed
about the Constitution’s specific content, they have an emotional bond with the document
that sustains its legitimacy and lasting integrity.” Gewirtzman, supra note 8, at 680.
106 Lessig, supra note 28, at 974. Steven Teles discusses this in the context of the legal
community. See TELES, supra note 90, at 16 (“A regime is most likely to endure when it can
make its ideas seem natural, appropriate, and commonsensical, consigning its opponents to
the extremes. . . . A regime that has achieved hegemony makes its principles seem like ‘good
professional practice,’ ‘standard operating procedure,’ ‘the public interest,’ or ‘conventional
wisdom.’”).
107 Lessig, supra note 28, at 975.
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but it is largely taken for granted as orthodox historical truth by most students and
parents, even as movement activists often battle over which versions of history are
taught to our children.108 By telling these stories and ignoring others, we collectively
remember or forget.109
Lessig explains this process well:
[T]he invented tradition begins with a certain kind of learning
through inculcation. The learning proceeds from an authority—a
government, or a university, or a church—that purports to report
the facts of the past, learned as uncontested. It succeeds to the
extent that this pattern of learning and inculcation succeeds at
freezing certain ideas about traditions into a taken-for-granted
pattern of thought or action.110
In the process, history transmits our tradition to future citizens, including schoolchil-
dren, through stories “told so often that [they] cannot be questioned as truth.”111
Public schools are an important site for this form of cultural transmission. However,
we can see a similar process at work in law schools and within the legal profession
as certain forms of argument, practice, and meaning (including constitutional
meaning) are transmitted as professional orthodoxy to each generation of lawyers.112
II. THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANON IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Bruce Ackerman’s extended treatment of the constitutional canon—the most
comprehensive account in recent literature—suggests the power of tending to it
closely in the context of the legal profession and its constitutional mission.113 In his
famous account of “constitutional moments,” Ackerman is primarily interested in
telling a story of constitutional development where the American people take center
stage.114 Nevertheless, he reserves an important role for the legal profession in this
larger story.115 While the American people, including movement leaders and key
108 See JONATHAN ZIMMERMAN, WHOSE AMERICA?: CULTURE WARS IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (2002).
109 Lessig, supra note 28, at 979.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 978.
112 See generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH (1999) (describing how the legal
profession adopted a contested reading of Reconstruction history as official legal history).
113 See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 3.
114 See id. at 1, 3, 44–47; 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 38 (1991)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS].
115 ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 114, at 38.
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elected officials, drive constitutional change, it falls primarily to the legal profession,
as the “keeper of the nation’s constitutional memory,” to preserve these achieve-
ments over time—in part by tending to the constitutional canon.116
Ackerman’s discussion of the constitutional canon is directed mostly, though
not exclusively, towards legal elites.117 While he acknowledges the canon’s impor-
tance to both the legal profession and the wider public,118 he spends a good deal of
time discussing the canon’s legal components—the constitutional stories that lawyers
tell each other and the rest of us.119 For Ackerman, the “constitutional canon” is “the
body of texts that law-trained professionals should place at the very center of their
constitutional understanding.”120 The canon is “necessarily selective,” with a chance
for either constitutional “insight or blindness.”121 It “package[s]” the “achievements
of the past . . . into easily readable form[s] for the very busy men and women”—
lawyers—“who are charged with sustaining our constitutional tradition.”122 For
instance, the Nation’s Founding and its immediate aftermath are largely defined by
the Constitution’s text itself, records of the debates at the Constitutional Convention,
The Federalist, and the great decisions of the Marshall Court, perhaps with a gloss
by Gordon Wood in his magisterial work, The Creation of the American Republic.123
More generally, the canon includes the original Constitution, its twenty-seven
amendments, and certain “superprecedents.”124 A complete and well-thought-out
canon is important to our constitutional system. Without one, Ackerman argues,
“constitutional law will fail to provide Americans the guidance they need as they
confront the challenges of the future,”125 as the actions, sources, and principles that
we choose to canonize “serve as precedents for future generations as they confront
the constitutional crises of the coming decades.”126 Rather than fixating on the
Constitution’s text and the Supreme Court’s glosses on it, the legal profession should
“redefine the canon to permit a deeper understanding of what Americans did, and
did not, accomplish over all of our history.”127
Importantly, Ackerman highlights three deficiencies in the constitutional canon
as it exists today. First, it mythologizes the Supreme Court;128 second, it worships
116 ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 121.
117 See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 114, at 38; see also ACKERMAN, CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 7.
118 See Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 14, at 1809.
119 ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 7.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 9.
122 Id. at 7.
123 See id.
124 Id. at 33.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 121.
127 Id. at 35.
128 Id. at 32–36.
928 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:911
our distant predecessors—particularly our Founding Fathers and the Reconstruction
Republicans;129 and third, it downplays the constitutional achievements of the twen-
tieth century.130 In the end, Ackerman laments that these three strands combine to
teach a rather troubling lesson: “Popular sovereignty is dead in America . . . .”131
Take, for example, the Civil Rights Revolution. In Ackerman’s view, the legal
profession has advanced a constitutional narrative that celebrates the Reconstruction
Amendments and the Warren Court, but gives short shrift to political leaders like
Lyndon B. Johnson and Everett Dirksen.132 While the Warren Court’s “precedent-
shattering reinterpretations of the Reconstruction Amendments” take center stage,
key political leaders and, ultimately, the American people emerge as mere “bit play-
ers.”133 In the process, the Civil Rights Revolution is reduced to a story of “common-
law development”—“a long conversation between judges, and only judges, over the
meaning of equality,”134 with the legal profession marveling at the Warren Court’s
doctrinal gymnastics as the Chief Justice and his colleagues gave new life to ancient
texts handed down by legal giants.135
For Ackerman, this narrative—one that canonizes key Article V amendments,
as well as certain landmark cases—is driven by unjustified formalism.136 The Founding
and Reconstruction yielded important pieces of constitutional text.137 The New Deal
and the Civil Rights Revolution did not.138 However, if the legal profession’s narra-
tive is right, then “We the People have made no big decisions for almost a century.”139
Furthermore, the current canon, and its focus on common-law constitutionalism,
gives later judges flexibility to “displac[e]” key constitutional principles like Brown’s
core insights “with other doctrines they [find] more compelling.”140 The danger here
is that if constitutional law is mere common-law development, untethered from the
principles endorsed by the American people over time, then later generations of
judges have the flexibility to erase some of our most significant constitutional
achievements, as in the case of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder.141
Importantly, Ackerman offers a compelling counter-narrative.
Rather than viewing the twentieth century as a period of constitutional stasis or
decline, he sees it as one of great constitutional creativity, with political leaders like
129 Id. at 340.
130 Id. at 9–10, 33–34.
131 Id. at 17.
132 Id. at 6.
133 Id. at 12.
134 Id. at 317.
135 Id. at 16.
136 Id. at 311.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 317.
141 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
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Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson securing even broader support for
their “radical reforms” than the likes of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln and,
in the process, carving out a new constitutional role for the federal government in com-
batting economic injustice and rooting out racial discrimination.142 For Ackerman,
the legal canon must move beyond “ancestor worship” and judicial supremacy to valo-
rize the American people’s “primary” twentieth-century spokespeople, such as Presi-
dents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson; canonize their handiwork, such
as the Social Security Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and treat those newly
canonical texts as legitimate sources of constitutional meaning, akin to the written Con-
stitution and transformative Supreme Court decisions.143 Above all, this revised canon
should make it clear that popular sovereignty remains alive and well in America.
In the end, the stories that lawyers choose to tell about our constitutional tra-
dition matter. Most obviously, they are of great practical importance to the legal
profession itself, shaping the lessons that students learn in law school, the arguments
that lawyers make in court, and the legal sources that judges treat as binding, or, at
least, persuasive, in individual cases.144 Given this, the legal canon helps define the
official meaning of the Constitution, or rather, constitutional doctrine. However, the
legal canon also influences the wider public.145
Of course, part of this influence is simply a function of the canon’s effect on
lawyer-leaders in the community. If lawyers serve disproportionately as political
leaders at the local, state, and national levels, then the constitutional stories that they
tell each other—in law school, in court, in law offices, at legal conferences, and in legal
publications—are of great practical importance to the wider community.146 They
influence these lawyers’ actions in office and their conception of what is constitu-
tionally possible and consistent with the American ethos.147 However, the legal
canon also exerts a more direct influence on ordinary Americans, filtering down into
the stories that comprise the popular constitutional canon—for instance, those that
citizens hear at our national shrines and learn in our public schools.148 In this sense,
our constitutional past, and how lawyers choose to preserve it, helps to define our
constitutional future.149
In the end, while Ackerman and his fellow constitutional scholars are right that
lawyers must tend to the legal canon, we must not lose sight of the forces shaping
its popular analog. Even as a defective legal canon risks erasing some of our key
142 ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 311.
143 See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
144 ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 121.
145 See id.
146 See Tushnet, supra note 22, at 194.
147 See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 93–122
(1982).
148 Lessig, supra note 28, at 975–76.
149 See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 1, 19, 33; Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling
Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104, 3143 (2014).
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constitutional achievements from legal doctrine, a defective popular constitutional
canon may harm us in a variety of other ways, many of which mirror the deficiencies
that Ackerman identifies in the legal canon. It may advance a form of “Founder wor-
ship” that stifles constitutional creativity, for instance, when it comes to making new
rights-based arguments or supporting potential institutional reforms.150 It may mythol-
ogize the Supreme Court’s role as privileged constitutional interpreter, therefore
transforming the Constitution into a mere lawyer’s document and dampening the
constitutional confidence of ordinary Americans.151 It may radicalize one side of a pub-
lic debate, transforming one’s own cause into the mythical Founders’ cause and
one’s opponents into enemies of the Constitution, undermining civic- republican virtue
and sowing civil discord in the process.152 Finally, it may shape public opinion (and
popular constitutional views), which, in turn, may shape constitutional doctrine.153
III. THE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL CANON AND ITS ROLE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIALIZATION
Constitutional socialization is the process through which ordinary Americans
learn about our constitutional tradition and develop their own constitutional views
and instincts.154 Throughout our lives, this process is often driven by forms of con-
stitutional storytelling,155 including the stories told by elites (such as presidential
inaugural addresses,156 Supreme Court opinions,157 and candidate stump speeches158)
and those told by ordinary Americans (such as parents at the dinner table, friends out
at a bar, and editorials in the local newspaper). Importantly, these stories also
150 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITU-
TION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 17 (2006) [hereinafter
LEVINSON, UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION].
151 See KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 4, at 247–48.
152 See Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?,
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1807, 1808–10 (2011); Ilya Somin, The Tea Party Movement and Popular
Constitutionalism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 300, 303–04 (2011). For example, if one believes that
the Founding generation was committed to a libertarian vision of government, she may con-
clude that the New Deal was not a political mistake, but was actually an “un-American”
move away from the Founders’ Constitution.
153 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 374; ROSEN, supra note 14.
154 For a helpful overview of scholarship on political socialization, see ERIKSON & TEDIN,
supra note 27.
155 See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 8, at 2–6; Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4
(1983); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juri-
centric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 947, 1032 (2002).
156 See Purdy, supra note 73, at 1837.
157 See Primus, supra note 72, at 1216.
158 See BUSCH, supra note 74.
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include the canonical narratives told by key institutions and public officials tasked
with transmitting historical truth to ordinary citizens, such as teachers in our public
schools, park rangers at our national shrines, and government officials crafting our
Nation’s naturalization test—in other words, the very stories that comprise the popular
constitutional canon.159
The popular constitutional canon refers to the set of stock stories that key
institutions like our public schools transmit to ordinary citizens.160 These stories are
intended to codify our shared constitutional understandings, a dynamic process that
draws on both academic consensus and institutional (often political) decision-
making.161 Regardless of the institutional details, the end product is a set of constitu-
tional stories that receives the imprimatur of a respected, seemingly non-partisan
institution and, therefore, may have an outsized influence on the constitutional views
of ordinary citizens—empowering them to question the constitutional status quo, to
make new rights-based claims, and to seek key institutional reforms.162
Of course, the popular constitutional canon is not the only game in town.
Constitutional partisans, including social movements, political parties, legal elites,
opinion leaders, and even judges, consistently make claims on the Constitution,
thereby shaping the constitutional views of ordinary citizens.163 Sometimes these
claims draw on uncontroversial premises about the Founders or a given constitu-
tional principle by linking support for a given policy initiative (e.g., a new anti-
discrimination law) to a key principle (e.g., equal protection).164 Other times, these
claims seek to use cultural memory to advance novel positions, such as using the
image of the Founders as tax-hating, limited-government crusaders to argue against
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate.165 In both
cases, constitutional partisans seek to shape the views of ordinary citizens.
The main difference between the stories told by such partisans and those that com-
prise the popular constitutional canon is their source. In one case, it is identifiably
partisan, and in the other case, it is not. Therefore, while the former may only convert
fellow partisans, the latter’s influence may sweep more broadly.166 To be clear, scholars
should be interested in both aspects of our constitutional culture. Nevertheless, the
popular constitutional canon is worth far more study than it has received so far.
159 For a classic (but decades-old) treatment of some of these sources by a cultural historian,
see KAMMEN, supra note 8.
160 See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
162 See Lessig, supra note 28, at 951.
163 See LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 90.
164 See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 311.
165 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010); Mark D.
Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli?: Limiting Principles and Popular Constitu-
tionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 66, 129–32 (2013).
166 See Lessig, supra note 28, at 951.
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Importantly, recent constitutional scholarship suggests a link between public
opinion and constitutional doctrine, especially for high-salience issues.167 The subtleties
of these findings—and there are many—are beyond the scope of this Article, as are
various strands of criticism.168 However, the weight of the evidence suggests that pop-
ular constitutional views matter.169 And if that is correct, then scholars should spend
more time studying the processes shaping them.
Scholars offer several explanations for why Supreme Court decisions have tended
to track public opinion over time.170 First, in some areas of constitutional law, pop-
ular constitutional views shape doctrine directly.171 For instance, in Eighth Amendment
cases, courts often turn to either public opinion or legislative enactments to discern
the “evolving standards of decency” in American society.172
Second, put simply, our system is designed that way.173 New elections bring new
presidents and new senators. Over time, justices leave the bench, either voluntarily or
involuntarily. They are then replaced with new justices who are appointed by presidents
and confirmed by senators who are elected by the American people. These newly con-
firmed justices are, therefore, likely to reflect the views of the winning electoral coali-
tion and, in the process, align constitutional doctrine with broader public opinion.174
Third, certain Justices jealously guard the Court’s overall public legitimacy.175
Therefore, over time, the Court hews fairly closely to mass opinion and often defers to
the democratically elected branches on high-salience cases in order to maintain its over-
all institutional reputation, sometimes at the expense of their own policy preferences.176
167 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme
Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 276–81 (2010).
168 Compare Baum & Devins, supra note 15, with Driver, supra note 15.
169 See Epstein & Martin, supra note 167, at 277–81.
170 See infra notes 171–80 and accompanying text.
171 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexception-
alism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 365, 365, 401 (2009).
172 Lain, supra note 171, at 365, 401.
173 See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty:
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 ST. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Keith E. Whittington,
“Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by
the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005).
174 FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 374; Balkin & Levinson, Canons of Constitutional Law,
supra note 22; Baum & Devins, supra note 15, at 1522–25; Epstein & Martin, supra note 167,
at 270. Of course, this process is often complicated by a variety of factors. The President may
guess wrong about a Justice’s actions once the Justice takes her seat on the Court, or may not
care much about a Justice’s constitutional vision (as opposed to her electoral payoff for the Presi-
dent). Despite these complications, the combination of elections and new appointments tend
to make constitutional doctrine track large-scale changes in public opinion over time.
175 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 383.
176 See id. at 375; Baum & Devins, supra note 15, at 1525–28. Many see Chief Justice John
Roberts’s vote to uphold the Affordable Care Act in this light. See Jeffery Rosen, Big Chief,
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On this view, the public sets parameters for what the Court can do on high-salience
issues.177 If the Court stays within those parameters, it has a considerable amount of
freedom to act.178 If it strays beyond them, it loses public legitimacy and becomes vul-
nerable to large-scale criticism and, in extreme cases, reprisals.179 As a result, certain
Justices are disinclined to decide cases involving high-salience issues in ways that
diverge sharply from public opinion or to act in ways that contradict the public’s
expectations for the Court.180
Fourth, the Justices themselves are members of the American public. Public opin-
ion shapes the world in which the justices live, which in turn can shape their consti-
tutional views.181 In other words, the justices are influenced by the same societal
changes and processes of constitutional socialization that affect everyone else. Al-
though elite opinions, like those of the Justices, are often more firmly felt and therefore
more difficult to dislodge than those of ordinary Americans, elite opinions can change
too. Sweeping societal changes on high-salience constitutional issues, whether it be race
in the 1950s and 1960s, gender equality in the 1970s, or gay rights in the 1990s and
2000s, can influence certain Justices.182 Indeed, some Justices have even acknowl-
edged as much.183
While these explanations do not settle the debate over the relationship between
public opinion and constitutional doctrine, they do suggest the importance of tending
to the processes of constitutional socialization. Before turning to Part IV, it is worth
pausing for a moment to consider why heightened polarization increases the importance
of such a scholarly agenda.
We live in a polarized age.184 With polarization increasing, we can expect pop-
ular constitutionalism to resemble a series of battles between committed, entrenched
NEW REPUBLIC (July 13, 2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/104898/john-roberts-supreme
-court-aca [https://perma.cc/7894-P2MT].
177 See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution,
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1996).
178 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 4.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 88 (2013);
FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 371 (quoting Justice O’Connor on the relationship between public
opinion and judicial decision-making); Baum & Devins, supra note 15, at 1521; Epstein &
Martin, supra note 167, at 263–64, 277–79; William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and
Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 768 (1986).
182 See Baum & Devins, supra note 15, at 1521.
183 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 9, at 371 (quoting Justice O’Connor); Rehnquist, supra note
181, at 768 (“Judges, so long as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more escape
being influenced by public opinion in the long run than can people working at other jobs.”).
184 See MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 20, at 3; Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and
Constitutional Change, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 989, 992–93 (2013).
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factions of “constitutional Protestants.”185 In turn, these factions will attempt to expand
their influence, channeling the hydraulic force of polarization to influence the con-
stitutional views of our leading political parties and, in the process, ordinary citizens
connected with those parties.186 From the perspective of the constitutional Protestant,
polarization makes it easier for each faction to “proselytize” and “grow the faith”
quickly.187 Once one of the leading political parties has a “conversion experience,”
their partisans will similarly adopt the new constitutional dogma.188 Constitutional
factions, driven by constitutional passion, have several mechanisms for spreading
their constitutional views, including converting party leaders on the merits, threatening
them with bruising primary battles driven by grassroots activism, or some combination
of such tactics.189 Once key party leaders convert to the new constitutional faith, their
partisans, many of which are members of the general public, are likely to follow suit.190
However, polarization also limits the eventual reach of a new constitutional
movement.191 Polarization makes it difficult to build a movement that transcends
party lines—both among members of the public and among elected officials.192 At
the institutional level, partisan polarization makes bipartisan actions in our elected
branches, including actions to promote a new constitutional vision, more difficult.193
This places a ceiling on most constitutional evangelizing, making a broadly popular
constitutional faith less likely.194 Therefore, we may see increased criticisms of
government actions and Supreme Court decisions, but fewer bipartisan actions in
Congress and fewer genuine threats to judicial supremacy.195
Finally, polarization may have one additional effect on popular constitutional
activism. Since bipartisan action on visible issues at the national level is more dif-
ficult, constitutional factions will look elsewhere to exercise their influence.196 Of
course, some will remain interested in constitutional litigation.197 However, constitu-
tional scholars must also examine (and monitor) key sites of potential influence at
the state and local level. With gridlock in Washington, D.C., constitutional factions
185 See LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH, supra note 90, at 17–18, 29.
186 See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 8, at 198–99 (discussing LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
FAITH, supra note 90).
187 See id.
188 Id. at 198.
189 Id. at 227–36.
190 See id. at 239.
191 See Hasen, supra note 184, at 1013–19 (discussing the obstacles faced by the Tea Party
in enacting its constitutional vision).
192 Id. at 1014–18.
193 Id. at 1016–18.
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 Schmidt, supra note 8, at 217–18.
197 Id. at 237 (discussing the Tea Party’s efforts to strike down Obamacare through the
courts).
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may target subnational institutions with outsized national influence.198 State and
local institutions that shape constitutional education, especially those with an outsized
national influence, may become prime targets.199 This is precisely why it is so im-
portant for legal scholars to tend to the process of constitutional socialization and
to the content of the popular constitutional canon.200
IV. TENDING TO THE POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL CANON, A CASE STUDY:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PATHOLOGIES OF CIVIC EDUCATION
The stories that we tell our schoolchildren are a core part of the popular consti-
tutional canon. Public education, including some combination of American history
and government courses, is one of the few sustained ways in which we transmit our
canonical constitutional lessons to large groups of Americans.201
These lessons are often taught at an important time in a citizen’s life—namely,
when her public attitudes are still forming, and she is generally receptive to new
lessons.202 While earlier political science research was skeptical of the importance
of civic education,203 more recent research confirms what political partisans have
long suspected: the lessons we teach to our schoolchildren matter.204 Therefore, it
198 See Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All
the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 49 (2010).
199 Goldstein, supra note 19, at 839, 859–60; Schmidt, supra note 8, at 217–18.
200 Balkin, New Originalism, supra note 105, at 717.
201 See Royal & Hofman, supra note 103, at 969.
202 See ERIKSON & TEDIN, supra note 27, at 125, 135–37.
203 RICHARD G. NIEMI & JANE JUNN, CIVIC EDUCATION: WHAT MAKES STUDENTS LEARN
13–20, 61–63 (1998); Thomas L. Dynneson & Richard E. Gross, The Educational Per-
spective: Citizenship Education in American Society, in SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1, 10–11, 15–17 (Richard E. Gross & Thomas L. Dynneson eds.,
1991); Galston, supra note 62, at 218–19, 231; Linimon & Joslyn, supra note 61, at 27.
204 CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y. & CIRCLE: THE CENTER FOR INFORMATION & RESEARCH
ON CIVIC LEARNING & ENGAGEMENT, THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS 14, 22–25 (2003);
CHRIS CHAPMAN, MARY JO NOLIN & KAREN KLINE, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTICS, STATISTICS IN BRIEF: STUDENT INTEREST IN NATIONAL NEWS AND ITS RELATION
TO SCHOOL COURSES 4 (1997); ERIKSON & TEDIN, supra note 27, at 135; NIEMI & JUNN,
supra note 203, at 70; Maryam Ahranjani et al., Evaluating High School Students’ Consti-
tutional and Civic Literacy: A Case Study of the Washington, D.C. Chapter of the Marshall-
Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 917, 919–22 (2013); Richard
A. Brody, Civic Education and Political Attitudes: The “We the People . . .” Curriculum, 10
GOOD SOC’Y 29, 30–34 (2001); Robert L. Dudley & Alan R. Gitelson, Civic Education, Civic
Engagement, and Youth Civic Development, 36 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 263, 265 (2003); Ehman,
supra note 62, at 101–03; Lauren Feldman et al., Identifying Best Practices in Civic Education:
Lessons from the Student Voices Program, 114 AM. J. EDUC. 75 (2007); Galston, supra note
62, at 223; Joseph E. Kahne & Susan E. Sporte, Developing Citizens: The Impact of Civic Learn-
ing Opportunities on Students’ Commitment to Civic Participation, 45 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 738,
740 (2008); Joseph Kahne & Ellen Middaugh, High Quality Civic Education: What Is It and
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is little wonder that generations of political and constitutional activists have battled
over the lessons that we teach in our schools.205
Educators and activists have long seen our nation’s textbooks as a key way in
which we promote a “collective identity” by passing along “stories of important past
events (e.g., describing the origins of the nation) and stories of important past
leaders (e.g., describing the heroic Founding Fathers)” to future leaders and citi-
zens.206 For many, these books “now serve as the prayer-books of the United States’s
civil religion.”207
Education scholar David Tyack contends that history textbooks “reveal what
adults thought children should learn about the past and are probably the best index
of what teachers tried to teach young Americans.”208 Activists, hence, have long
understood that when it comes to public school textbooks, the stakes are high.209 As
Tyack explains, “People have wanted history texts to tell the official truth about the
past. . . . Textbooks resemble stone monuments. Designed to commemorate and re-
present emblematic figures, events, and ideas—and thus to create common civic
bonds—they have also aroused vigorous dissent.”210 As Frances FitzGerald adds,
“Like time capsules, . . . [our textbooks] contain the truths selected for posterity.”211
This has led activists on both the left and the right to advocate for their own preferred
versions of American history in our Nation’s schools, often by trying to influence
the textbook adoption processes in large states like California and Texas.212
In this Part, I draw on my own previous scholarship on American civic education
to suggest the normative payoff of tending to the popular constitutional canon.213
Who Gets It?, 72 SOC. EDUC. 34, 34 (2008); Laura McNabb, Civic Outreach Programs: Com-
mon Models, Shared Challenges, and Strategic Recommendations, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 871,
880, 888 (2013); Pasek et al., supra note 62; Dawinder S. Sidhu, Civic Education as an Instru-
ment of Social Mobility, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 977, 983 (2013); Torney-Purta, supra note 62.
205 Perhaps the greatest evidence of the overall importance of civic education is the per-
sistent war over its content throughout American history, and especially from the twentieth
century onward. See FRANCES FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 47 (1979); ROBERT LERNER ET AL., MOLDING THE GOOD CITIZEN:
THE POLITICS OF HIGH SCHOOL HISTORY TEXTS 1 (1995); DAVID TYACK, SEEKING COMMON
GROUND: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 41 (2003).
206 Lloyd Kramer & Donald Reid, Introduction: Historical Knowledge, Education, and Pub-
lic Culture, in LEARNING HISTORY IN AMERICA: SCHOOLS, CULTURES, AND POLITICS 1, 4–5
(Lloyd Kramer et al. eds., 1994).
207 LERNER ET AL., supra note 205, at 1.
208 TYACK, supra note 205, at 40.
209 Id. at 40–41.
210 Id. at 40. See generally FITZGERALD, supra note 205 (providing a colorful account of the
American textbook wars from the early republic through the 1970s).
211 FITZGERALD, supra note 205, at 47.
212 TYACK, supra note 205, at 59.
213 For an explanation of my methodological choices, including why I selected the specific
textbooks used in this Article and why I chose textbook analysis in the first place, see Donnelly,
Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 1000–01.
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This research uses content from our leading American history textbooks, ranging from
those used in the early twentieth to twenty-first centuries, to draw conclusions about
the consensus lessons transmitted to American high-school students over time.214
This visit to our Nation’s classrooms highlights the various ways in which the lessons
that we are teaching our schoolchildren undermine popular sovereignty, including
mythologizing the Supreme Court, promoting “Founder worship,” and downplaying
the constitutional achievements of successive generations. Interestingly, these patholo-
gies mirror those that Ackerman perceives in the legal canon.215
A. Mythologizing the Supreme Court
Ordinary citizens reserve a special place for the Supreme Court as a privileged
constitutional interpreter.216 Over time, this image has been reinforced by the lessons
taught in our leading high-school textbooks.217 These lessons mythologize the Su-
preme Court and delegitimize popular challenges to its authority.
In our leading textbooks, the Supreme Court emerges largely as the Court of
Marbury v. Madison218 and Brown v. Board of Education.219 From Marbury, stu-
dents are taught that judicial review is an unproblematic feature of our constitutional
system, and that the Court itself has long served as the legitimate “guardian of our Con-
stitution.”220 From Brown, students learn that the Court is the courageous protector of
our most cherished rights and an important engine of social change.221 Taken together,
these lessons—products of by far the most detailed Court-based narratives included
in our leading textbooks—buttress the Court’s constitutional and moral authority.222
Importantly, our leading textbooks also use certain key episodes in American
history to delegitimize popular challenges to the Supreme Court’s authority.223
While these textbooks largely ignore examples that serve more appealing normative
goals (like the Reconstruction Congress’s fight to protect its policies in the South),
214 Id.
215 See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
216 See Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 982–84.
217 Id.
218 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
219 See Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 978.
220 DANIEL J. BOORSTIN & BROOKS MATHER KELLEY, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
191 (2005). See also Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 982–84 (describing our
textbooks’ treatment of Marbury).
221 See Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 981–82.
222 See id. at 977–79. As my previous research shows, there were six cases cited in all eleven
of the twenty-first century textbooks that I studied: Marbury, Brown, Dred Scott, McCulloch
v. Maryland, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Worcester v. Georgia. Id. at 918. Interestingly, earlier
textbooks excluded Plessy. Id. at 981. However, after Brown, Plessy became an essential part
of the constitutional stories told in our schools (as an anti-canonical case). Id.
223 See id. at 984–99.
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our textbooks often link anti-Court resistance to the actions of self-serving politi-
cians and leaders on the wrong side of history.224
For instance, our leading textbooks include the story of Worcester v. Georgia225
and the battle over President Andrew Jackson’s “Indian removal” policy.226 This
narrative offers the image of a heroic John Marshall standing up to a stubborn and
racist Andrew Jackson.227 Our textbooks teach similar lessons through other canoni-
cal episodes like Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “court-packing” plan, which demonstrates
that even our greatest leaders sometimes ignore important constitutional principles,228
and Southern defiance after Brown, which links anti-Court challenges to the actions
of bitter-end racists.229 Taken together, these examples suggest to our students that
public challenges to the Court’s authority are often tinged with troubling motives.
Interestingly, earlier textbooks provide subtler accounts of some key episodes of
popular constitutional activism, often providing additional political and substantive
context for certain challenges to the Supreme Court’s authority.
Early accounts of Marbury frame the case as a standoff between key figures with
competing constitutional visions.230 Chief Justice Marshall emerges as a key leader
within the Federalist Party—one with (as a 1940s textbook explains) “stronger views
upon the necessity of having a national government with strength enough to govern
than Alexander Hamilton” and one who “detested his cousin and fellow-Virginian,
Thomas Jefferson.”231 Early textbooks also use Marbury as a means of questioning
the origins of judicial review—for instance, with one 1960s textbook describing Chief
Justice Marshall and the Marbury Court as “assum[ing]” power as “guardian of the
Constitution”—a power that was not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution’s text.232
Another early textbook highlights one key normative criticism of judicial review, ex-
plaining that following Chief Justice Marshall’s embrace of judicial review in Marbury,
“the opinion of a single justice can determine what is law for one hundred and fifty mil-
lion people when the court, as it has frequently done in important cases, hands down
a five-to-four decision.”233 This textbook adds that “[i]n no other self-governing country
in the world is such power given to so small a group of men.”234 These subtler
accounts of Marbury are replaced by more celebratory accounts in later decades.235
224 See id. at 997–99.
225 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
226 Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 988–89.
227 Id. at 989.
228 Id. at 992–93.
229 Id. at 997–99.
230 Id. at 983–84.
231 EUGENE C. BARKER & HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, OUR NATION 285 (1949).
232 HENRY W. BRAGDON & SAMUEL P. MCCUTCHEN, HISTORY OF A FREE PEOPLE 196 (1967).
233 DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, A HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY: A TEXTBOOK FOR HIGH-SCHOOL
STUDENTS 166 (1943).
234 Id. at 167.
235 Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 984.
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Furthermore, while recent textbooks gesture toward Jefferson’s frustration with
the Federalist judiciary and tell the unfortunate story of John Adams’s “midnight
appointments,” students learn little about the constitutional battle between Jefferson
and the Federalist judiciary over the meaning of the Constitution.236 Far from em-
phasizing Jefferson’s aggressive assault on the judiciary by impeaching judges and
removing an entire layer of the federal judiciary, twenty-first century textbooks portray
a helpless Jefferson.237 For instance, one textbook explains, “Though Jefferson ended
many Federalist programs, he had little power over the courts. . . . Jefferson often
felt frustrated by Federalist control of the courts. Yet because judges received their
appointments for life, the president could do little.”238 Tell that to the circuit judges who
lost their jobs after the Jeffersonian Congress repealed Adams’s Judiciary Act!239
Earlier textbooks provide additional details about Jefferson’s attack on the Fed-
eralist judiciary, including the repeal of the Judiciary Act and the push to impeach
Federalist judges, most notably, Justice Samuel Chase.240 Rather than rejecting these
efforts as mere acts of political self-interest, some of these earlier textbooks offer
supportive reasons for Jefferson’s assault, describing federal judges as “beyond the
control of the people”241 since they were “not controlled by popular vote,”242 criticiz-
ing them as “political[ly] bias[ed],”243 and adding that Chief Justice Marshall’s
constitutional vision was “harmful” to President Jefferson.244 Later in the twentieth
century, this additional texture disappears from our leading textbooks.245
We see a similar shift in our leading textbooks’ treatment of Franklin D. Roose-
velt’s “court-packing” plan. In our twenty-first century textbooks, his attempt to
“pack the court” emerges as a serious constitutional mistake, an attack on judicial
independence, and a blight on his presidential legacy.246 For instance, one textbook
describes Roosevelt as trying “to ‘pack’ the Court with judges supportive of the
New Deal,” thus “inject[ing] politics into the judiciary” and threatening to “under-
mine the constitutional principle of separation of powers.”247
236 Id. at 982–84, 986–88.
237 See, e.g., JESUS GARCIA ET AL., CREATING AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
316 (2007).
238 Id.
239 See BRAGDON & MCCUTCHEN, supra note 232, at 195–96.
240 Id.; LEON H. CANFIELD & HOWARD B. WILDER, THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA
164 (1962); MUZZEY, supra note 233, at 214, 215.
241 BRAGDON & MCCUTCHEN, supra note 232, at 195.
242 CANFIELD & WILDER, supra note 240, at 160.
243 HENRY F. GRAFF & JOHN A. KROUT, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ADVEN-
TURE OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 147 (1968).
244 FRANK FREIDEL & HENRY N. DREWRY, AMERICA: A MODERN HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 152 (1970).
245 See Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 984.
246 Id. at 992–93.
247 ANDREW CAYTON ET AL., AMERICA: PATHWAYS TO THE PRESENT 551 (2005).
940 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:911
As with Jefferson’s attack on the Federalist judiciary, earlier textbooks offer ad-
ditional context for Roosevelt’s court-packing plan. One earlier textbook explains
that the New Deal Court had “invalidate[d] laws passed by a large majority of Con-
gress.”248 Another presents a sympathetic account of Roosevelt’s rationale for the
plan: “Those who supported the change contended that the Court was already packed,
and that this was merely an effort to unpack it, and that the Court should be in harmony
with the purposes of the people as expressed through the political branches.”249 Yet
another frames Roosevelt’s plan as an alternative to other, more radical reform
proposals—such as requiring “a unanimous, or at least a two-thirds, vote of the justices”
before striking down a law, “allow[ing] Congress to override [Supreme Court] de-
cisions by a two-thirds vote,” “submit[ting] [Supreme Court decisions] to a popular
referendum,” or “forbid[ing] the court” from “annul[l]ing [federal] laws.”250 To be
sure, these earlier accounts also include criticisms of Roosevelt’s plan—however,
they offer a subtler, richer account of this constitutional battle and its stakes.251
In the end, the lessons in our twenty-first century textbooks reinforce the Court’s
image as the final arbiter of constitutional meaning, much as Larry Kramer might
expect and lament.252 While leading textbooks from earlier decades include criti-
cisms of judicial review and more nuanced accounts of certain public challenges to
the Court’s authority, those from more recent decades—especially after Brown—are
more celebratory of judicial review and, in turn, the Court’s current role within our
constitutional system.253 In the process, these stories help to promote a constitutional
culture that is deferential to the Supreme Court and its constitutional commands.
B. Promoting “Founder Worship”
The American people love their “Founding Fathers,” and the lessons taught in
our classrooms reinforce this culture of “Founder worship.”254 This has been true
since at least the early twentieth century, and it is a product, in part, of popular efforts
to shape the Founding-era narratives taught to our schoolchildren.255
When revisionist historians like Charles Beard began attacking the Founders in the
early twentieth century, the American people fought back.256 Driven by a common
248 MUZZEY, supra note 233, at 852–53.
249 BARKER & COMMAGER, supra note 231, at 935.
250 MUZZEY, supra note 233, at 853.
251 Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 993.
252 See Kramer, Generating Constitutional Meaning, supra note 4, at 1440.
253 See Donnelly, Stories We Tell, supra note 31, at 999.
254 See Donnelly, Forgotten Founders, supra note 31, at 132–34.
255 See id.
256 See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (1913). For summaries of this revisionist scholarship, see DOUGLASS
ADAIR, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 75, 80 (Trevor
Colbourn ed., 1974); and Ackerman, Living Constitution, supra note 14, at 1795–98.
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fear that historians like Beard might corrupt American students, patriotic groups,
leading religious and ethnic organizations, and other angry Americans worked together
to ensure that revisionist accounts of the Founding did not find their way into public
school classrooms—even pushing for legislation that banned the Beardian account
from school curricula.257 Similar efforts lasted well into the 1930s and 40s,258 and,
following this flurry of popular activity, not even Charles and Mary Beard’s own
widely used history textbook taught the Beardian version of the Founding.259 Our
leading textbooks have celebrated the Founders and their Constitution ever since.
The consensus narrative has long praised the Founders for their collective and in-
dividual brilliance. The Founders emerge from our textbooks as “famous,”260 “thought-
ful,”261 “energetic,”262 “notable,”263 “very distinguished,”264 the “outstanding leaders
in America,”265 “an assembly of demigods,”266 and “[f]ather[s] of the Constitution.”267
Individually, our textbooks celebrate certain Founders like Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison as constitutional heroes, with Hamilton remembered as Washing-
ton’s loyal lieutenant and a key author of The Federalist268 and Madison described
as the “Father of the Constitution.”269
Finally, our textbooks present the original Constitution itself as a model charter270
and tell a powerful story of constitutional continuity.271 This story stresses the dura-
bility of the Founders’s original scheme,272 the enduring power of their Bill of
257 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 108, at 14, 36.
258 Id. at 14.
259 Id. at 14, 19.
260 CANFIELD & WILDER, supra note 240, at 132–33.
261 FREMONT P. WIRTH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICA 190 (1945).
262 BOORSTIN & KELLEY, supra note 220, at 117.
263 CANFIELD & WILDER, supra note 240, at 132–33.
264 DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY, A HISTORY OF OUR COUNTRY 173 (1942).
265 FREMONT P. WIRTH, UNITED STATES HISTORY 104–05 (rev. ed. 1955).
266 MUZZEY, supra note 264, at 173.
267 WIRTH, supra note 265, at 104–05.
268 See, e.g., BOORSTIN & KELLEY, supra note 220, at 116 (presenting Hamilton as a “bold”
and “brillian[t]” leader); CANFIELD & WILDER, supra note 240, at 149 (highlighting Hamilton’s
“talent” and “patriotism”).
269 See, e.g., CAYTON ET AL., supra note 247, at 57 (2005) (presenting Madison as one of
the best-informed men at the Constitutional Convention); GERALD A. DANZER ET AL., THE
AMERICANS 141 (2007) (emphasizing Madison’s “brilliant political leadership” at the Found-
ing); WIRTH, supra note 265, at 104 (describing Madison as “a profound student of government
and history”).
270 See, e.g., CANFIELD & WILDER, supra note 240, at 138 (“World statesmen have been
astonished that the men who framed this document could have finished such a tremendous
task in only four months.”); CAYTON ET AL., supra note 247, at 58 (explaining that the Constitu-
tion “continues to inspire people around the world”); MUZZEY, supra note 264, at 173, 178
(presenting the 1787 Constitution as a “[w]onderful [a]chievement”).
271 See infra notes 267–69 and accompanying text.
272 See, e.g., EDWARD L. AYERS ET AL., HOLT AMERICAN ANTHEM 156 (2007) (“[T]he
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Rights,273 and the small number of constitutional amendments ratified in the inter-
vening years.274 In short, our leading textbooks promote a belief in what Kurt Lash has
called the “constitutional big bang”275—the notion that all real constitutional creativity
happened at the Founding and that all successive generations have simply refined the
Founders’s near-perfect system.276 Never mind that many of the key structural fea-
tures of the original Constitution, like the Three-Fifths Clause, entrenched the slave
power, or that the Founders’s Bill of Rights required the Fourteenth Amendment—
and a series of twentieth-century Supreme Court decisions—to give it real bite.277
In the end, a constitutional culture of “Founder worship” may stifle constitu-
tional innovation.278 If the American people view the Founders as geniuses, then
they may see little need to alter the mechanics of their constitutional system or add
new constitutional principles to their charter.279 Over time, this may dampen popular
sovereignty and reinforce the constitutional status quo.280 Rather than channeling
their widespread disaffection with American politics into a movement for constitu-
tional reform, the American people may simply conclude that the problem is not the
system itself or the Constitution’s text, but rather the “bums” that currently hold
office or the justices that currently sit on the Supreme Court.281
Of course, Ackerman expressed parallel fears about “ancestor worship” in the legal
canon.282 Unfortunately, the stories captured in our leading high-school textbooks
are even worse in this regard than those told by the legal profession.
basic structure of the federal government [today] remains exactly as the Framers envisioned it
over 200 years ago.”); WIRTH, supra note 265, at 106 (arguing that the 1787 Constitution “finally
solved” the “difficult problem of obtaining a proper balance between the central government
and the states”).
273 See, e.g., AYERS ET AL., supra note 272, at 49 (“Most of the amendments that form the
Bill of Rights listed things that no government, state or federal, could do.” (emphasis added));
CANFIELD & WILDER, supra note 240, at 140 (“The Bill of Rights has become one of the
foundation stones of our American way of life.”).
274 See, e.g., CANFIELD & WILDER, supra note 240, at 143 (“The changes that have been made
in the original work of the Constitutional delegates are remarkably few.”); CAYTON ET AL., supra
note 247, at 58 (“Perhaps the best proof of this flexibility is the fact that the Constitution has
been amended just 27 times in the nation’s history.”).
275 Kurt T. Lash, Two Movements of a Constitutional Symphony: Akhil Reed Amar’s The Bill
of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 485, 487 (1999).
276 See supra notes 269–70 and accompanying text.
277 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 251–57, 351–52
(2005); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 160–62,
288–89 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Back to the Future?
How the Bill of Rights Might Be about Structure After All, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 977, 993 (1999).
278 See LEVINSON, UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 150, at 16–17.
279 See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 8, at 11; Balkin, New Originalism,
supra note 105, at 697.
280 See KAMMEN, supra note 8, at 22; Gewirtzman, supra note 8, at 675–76.
281 See Balkin, Distribution of Political Faith, supra note 8, at 1171–72.
282 See ACKERMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 22, at 16.
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C. Downplaying the Achievements of Successive Generations
Ackerman laments that the legal canon celebrates both the Founders and the
Reconstruction Republicans as genuine legal “giants,” while treating key twentieth-
century leaders like Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson as mere “bit
players.”283 The civic education canon is even worse. While the Founders receive
reverential treatment in our leading textbooks, these same textbooks even downplay
the constitutional achievements of the Reconstruction Republicans.284
To be sure, these accounts have improved dramatically in recent decades, trans-
formed by waves of revisionist scholarship from leading historians like Eric Foner
and legal scholars like Akhil Amar.285 Through the middle of the twentieth century, the
Dunning School’s critical account of Reconstruction dominated our leading textbooks
with stories of angry Radicals in Congress, corrupt Reconstruction governments in
the South, pliable and ignorant newly freed slaves, and victimized and impoverished
white Southerners.286 More recent textbooks have shifted this narrative in important
ways—most notably by taking seriously the abuses of African Americans in the Recon-
struction South.287 This shift leaves these accounts more sympathetic to the Recon-
struction Republicans’ substantive goals, even if their leaders still suffer in comparison
to the likes of George Washington, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton. In
twenty-first century textbooks, Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and their Republi-
can colleagues remain bitter and eager for vengeance.288 However, recent textbooks
link these feelings to the values underlying them—namely, a sincere concern for the
future of African Americans in the South.289 Even so, Reconstruction—in many ways,
America’s “Second Founding”—retains, at best, a mixed constitutional legacy in
recent textbooks.
283 Id. at 12, 16.
284 See Donnelly, Forgotten Founders, supra note 31, at 184.
285 See id. at 142–65.
286 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877,
at xix–xx (1988) (describing Dunning School scholarship and its account of Reconstruction);
John Hope Franklin, Mirror for Americans: A Century of Reconstruction History, 85 AM.
HIST. REV. 1, 3–4 (1980) (same).
287 See, e.g., GARY B. NASH, AMERICAN ODYSSEY: THE 20TH CENTURY AND BEYOND
188–89 (2004).
288 See, e.g., BOORSTIN & KELLEY, supra note 220, at 369 (presenting Reconstruction Re-
publicans as “vindictive,” arguing that they were “[h]ungry for power,” and contending that the
military occupation of the South was designed so that the former rebels would not “be al-
lowed to forget” that the South was a “conquered province”); NASH, supra note 287, at 185–86
(teaching that Reconstruction Republicans crafted a program that was “designed to punish the
former Confederate states” and challenging whether “the presence of federal troops was neces-
sary to bring about political and social changes in the South”).
289 See, e.g., NASH, supra note 287, at 186, 188–89 (explaining that Reconstruction “in-
creased the rights and freedoms of African-Americans”).
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For instance, our leading textbooks still use President Lincoln’s image to paint
the Reconstruction Republicans in an unflattering light. In particular, they contrast
President Lincoln’s gentleness with the Reconstruction Republicans’ “harsh[ness],”
and, in turn, Lincoln’s “lenient” vision for Reconstruction with the Radical Republi-
cans’ strict approach.290 On this account, Lincoln showed “his greatness—and his
forgiving spirit—by his plan for bringing Southerners back into the Union” as quickly
as possible.291 Instead of following Lincoln’s lead and moving quickly to restore the
Union, Reconstruction Republicans were “bitter against the Southern rebels”292 and
eager to “destroy the political power of former slaveholders.”293
Of course, Lincoln was tragically assassinated before having to face the core
challenge of Reconstruction—namely, determining how best to restore the Union
and promote freedom and equality for the newly freed slaves when faced with un-
repentant rebels and waves of white violence in the South.294 While we will never
know how Lincoln would have addressed this challenge, history suggests that a
policy of leniency and gentleness would have fallen well short of realizing the “new
birth of freedom” that Lincoln promised at Gettysburg.295 In the end, although recent
accounts of Reconstruction are a vast improvement over those of earlier decades,
students still must reject this “But-for-Lincoln” narrative to embrace fully the Recon-
struction Republicans.
In addition, none of the leaders of Reconstruction emerge from recent textbooks
as genuine constitutional heroes.296 Thaddeus Stevens receives the most extensive
treatment, but even those accounts mix Stevens’s noble motives297 with his appetite
for vengeance.298 Charles Sumner is also mentioned in many textbooks, but he is re-
membered mostly for getting caned on the Senate floor and not for his many
contributions to Reconstruction’s constitutional legacy.299 Most troubling of all,
290 DANZER ET AL., supra note 269, at 377.
291 BOORSTIN & KELLEY, supra note 220, at 362.
292 Id. at 361.
293 DANZER ET AL., supra note 269, at 377.
294 See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY
290–322 (2010); BROOKS D. SIMPSON, THE RECONSTRUCTION PRESIDENTS 8–64 (1998).
295 See FONER, supra note 294, at 333–36; SIMPSON, supra note 294, at 63–64; see also
ALLEN C. GUELZO, RECONSTRUCTION: A CONCISE HISTORY (2018); RICHARD WHITE, THE
REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
GILDED AGE, 1865–1896 (2017).
296 See infra notes 292–96 and accompanying text.
297 See, e.g., BOORSTIN & KELLEY, supra note 220, at 362 (“Very early in life Stevens took
up the great cause of abolishing slavery.”); DANZER ET AL., supra note 269, at 377 (“Stevens
hated slavery . . . .”).
298 See, e.g., AYERS ET AL., supra note 272, at 410 (leading a section with the heading,
“Why was Thaddeus Stevens so angry?”); BOORSTIN & KELLEY, supra note 220, at 362, 367
(presenting Thaddeus Stevens as a “Radical avenger” and “one of the strangest men in
American history”).
299 See, e.g., CAYTON ET AL., supra note 247, at 140.
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John Bingham, who Justice Hugo Black described as the “Madison” of Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment,300 is ignored.301
Although these textbooks do celebrate the noble goals of the Reconstruction
Republicans and the constitutional amendments that their generation ratified,302
students still leave this pivotal era with only a vague sense of the broader constitu-
tional revolution that Stevens, Sumner, Bingham, and their colleagues waged and
of the important characters driving this key period of American constitutional his-
tory.303 This is, of course, in sharp contrast with our leading textbooks’ portrayal of
the Founding.
By ignoring some of the original Constitution’s most glaring defects and down-
playing the constitutional achievements of successive generations, our leading
textbooks promote the belief that somehow we still live under the constitutional
regime that the Founders envisioned, rather than one that was transformed by the
Civil War, Reconstruction, the New Deal, the Civil Rights Revolution, the Women’s
Rights Movement, and the LGBT Rights Movement, among many others. This pathol-
ogy may dampen the current generation’s enthusiasm for constitutional reform.
Furthermore, this skewed emphasis may also drive originalism’s traditional obses-
sion with the Founding at the expense of other key periods of constitutional reform
like Reconstruction.304
In the end, constitutional education should inspire constitutional faith—a faith in
the current generation’s ability to redeem the promise of our Constitution’s deepest
principles and improve on the framework inherited from previous generations.305
300 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). For a full biog-
raphy of John Bingham, see GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN
BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2013).
301 See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 300, at 10–11.
302 See, e.g., CAYTON ET AL., supra note 247, at 207 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was “a turning point” whose “effects have echoed throughout American history”).
303 See Donnelly, Forgotten Founders, supra note 31, at 168–69.
304 See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 277, at 242 (“Advocates and scholars focus all
their analytic and narrative attention on the Creation, not the Reconstruction.”); Balkin, New
Originalism, supra note 105, at 694 (“Even the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments—
including John Bingham, Thaddeus Stevens, Lyman Trumbull, William P. Fessenden,
Charles Sumner, and Jacob Howard—have remarkably little ethical authority given the im-
portance of these amendments, and are known today mostly to specialists.”); Jamal Greene,
Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 980 (2012) (arguing that “origi-
nalism in practice is not just a method of interpretation, but rather—and most persuasively—
a normative claim on American identity” and “originalists’ ethical compass infrequently points
toward the Reconstruction era or the political work of the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters”).
305 See BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 8, at 8–9; Gewirtzman, supra
note 8, at 675–76; Melissa Hart, Foreword: Public Constitutional Literacy: A Conversation,
90 DENV. U. L. REV. 825, 826 (2013).
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V. AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
My research on civic education suggests various pathologies that may dampen
the constitutional confidence of the American people. It also points toward four
distinct avenues of future popular constitutionalism research.
First, it suggests the value of continuing to tend to civic education as a site of
constitutional socialization. While my previous research has focused on the content
of the civic-education canon, future research should turn toward the state and local
administrative processes that shape this content—especially the state administrative
regimes that exert an outsized influence on textbook content nationwide, such as
those in California, Florida, Indiana, New York, North Carolina, and Texas.306 This
new research should consider all key features of these administrative processes: from
the board members’ campaigns for office, to the range of curricular suggestions pro-
vided by the public, to the final curricular decisions made by the various state agencies.
Furthermore, it should focus on how these regimes attempt to strike a balance be-
tween the desire for public input and democratic accountability on the one hand, and
the need for technical and academic expertise on the other.307 Throughout, it should
also pay attention to any attempts by individual citizens or larger groups of citizens
to influence the constitutional lessons that we teach our public school students.308
Second, popular constitutionalists should also study other key institutions tasked
with transmitting official historical truth to ordinary citizens. For example, they
should tend to the narratives presented at various national shrines throughout the
country like Independence Hall, the National Constitution Center, and Monticello.309
These sites are well positioned to make a lasting impression on their visitors,
offering a captive audience mostly new information transmitted by authoritative
messengers who pitch themselves as credible and non-ideological.310 Furthermore,
306 See TYACK, supra note 205, at 59.
307 See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 33–34, 95 (2012).
308 For terrific accounts of the battles over American history textbooks, see FITZGERALD,
supra note 205; TYACK, supra note 205, at 41; and ZIMMERMAN, supra note 108.
309 See, e.g., EDWARD TABOR LINENTHAL, SACRED GROUND: AMERICANS AND THEIR BAT-
TLEFIELDS 87–125 (1991) (telling the story of the Gettysburg battlefield); TIMOTHY B. SMITH,
ALTOGETHER FITTING AND PROPER: CIVIL WAR BATTLEFIELD PRESERVATION IN HISTORY,
MEMORY, AND POLICY, 1861–2015 (2017); Erika Doss, Commemorating Disaster and Disobe-
dience: National Park Service Initiatives in the 21st Century, 97 SOC. SCI. Q. 105, 108 (2016)
(discussing the battle over Custer battlefield); Jadelyn J. Moniz Nakamura, Up in Arms!: The
Struggle to Preserve the Legacy of the National Park Service During Wartime, 47 HAW. J.
HIST. 179 (2013) (discussing Hawaii National Park’s use during World War II); Mariah
Zeisberg, A New Framing? Constitutional Representation at Philadelphia’s National Consti-
tution Center, 6 PERSP. POL. 553 (2008) (analyzing the constitutional stories at the National
Constitution Center).
310 See Page Putnam Miller, Reflections on Historical Advocacy and the National Park
Service, 9 PUB. HIST. 105, 106 (1987) (“Adults in this country who rarely read history books
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each site brings history to life—either because it is the actual site of an historic event,
a venue associated with a famous person, or a museum with a collection of impor-
tant artifacts.311 Taken together, these elements maximize the likelihood that these
sites will have a lasting effect on their visitors—either reshaping their views or rein-
forcing previous beliefs.312 This research should study the processes through which
these sites develop their content, the key stakeholders and interest groups that have
input, and, finally, the content of the actual lessons that these sites teach average citi-
zens. The National Park Service, in particular, is a promising research target along these
lines, as it is a government agency tasked with maintaining hundreds of sites throughout
the country and sharing these sites’ stories with millions of visitors each year.313
Third, in addition to research focusing on our national shrines, popular constitu-
tionalists should also examine other institutions serving a similar history-defining
function for average citizens. Possible research targets include the constitutional
lessons that recent immigrants must learn in order to pass the naturalization exam,
the curriculum that we teach our most gifted children (including in Advanced Place-
ment courses and the “We the People” program), the ceremonial speeches that our
public leaders deliver on key holidays like Constitution Day and the Fourth of July,
the degree requirements and related syllabi at American colleges and universities,
and the ways in which legal elites translate the Supreme Court’s handiwork into
newspaper articles and other commentary pieces consumed by the general public.
Throughout, popular constitutionalists should pay particular attention to the ways
in which the legal canon filters down into the stories told to ordinary citizens.
Fourth, and finally, popular constitutionalists should seek to fill in the details of
the larger process of constitutional socialization. Civic education is part of this
or attend historical programs glean a significant amount of information about and insights into
our nation’s history from historic parks.”).
311 See ORG. AM. HISTORIANS, IMPERILED PROMISE: THE STATE OF HISTORY IN THE NA-
TIONAL PARK SERVICE 1, 5 (2011) (“Millions of Americans each year cultivate a deeper
appreciation of the nation’s past through encounters with historic buildings, landscapes, and
narratives preserved by the NPS and its constituent agencies and programs.”).
312 See Michael G. Schene, The National Park Service and Historic Preservation: An
Introduction, 9 PUB. HIST. 6, 7 (1987) (“[T]he National Park Service has had as much influ-
ence in educating Americans about their history as any other institution.”).
313 See Doss, supra note 309, at 109 (“The U.S. National Park Service is the major institu-
tional body in America today charged with shaping understandings of national identity through
its management of America’s national parks, memorials, historic trails, historic sites, and
more.”). For examples of the existing historical literature on the National Park Services’ His-
tory Program, see RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS
(1984); BARRY MACKINTOSH, THE HISTORIC SITES SURVEY AND NATIONAL HISTORIC LAND-
MARKS PROGRAM: A HISTORY (1985); DENISE D. MERINGOLO, MUSEUMS, MONUMENTS, AND
NATIONAL PARKS: TOWARD A NEW GENEAOLOGY OF PUBLIC HISTORY (2012); ORG. AM.
HISTORIANS, supra note 311; Edwin C. Bearss, The National Park Service and Its History Pro-
gram: 1864–1986: An Overview, 9 PUB. HIST. 10 (1987); Barry Mackintosh, The National
Park Service Moves into Historical Interpretation, 9 PUB. HIST. 51 (1987); and Donald C. Swain,
The National Park Service and the New Deal, 1933–1940, 41 PAC. HIST. REV. 312 (1972).
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larger process—as are the various items mentioned above, but there are a number
of other forces shaping the constitutional views of ordinary Americans. Moving
forward, popular constitutionalists should work to identify these forces, study them,
and chart the constitutional life cycle of the average citizen.
CONCLUSION
The stories that we tell about our constitutional past matter. They shape how
lawyers learn about the Constitution and influence the sorts of arguments that they
make in court and what judges accept as legally legitimate. In turn, through their
elevated status as leaders in American society, lawyers often transmit the values of
the legal canon to ordinary citizens, shaping their public actions and their private
thoughts. Lawyers may promote these values through their participation as political,
civic, and thought leaders. At times, the legal canon also finds its way into our public
schools, shaping the views of an attentive audience—students. In the end, the Ameri-
can constitutional project, rooted in popular sovereignty, rests on the constitutional
norms and narratives transmitted to lawyers and ordinary citizens alike. Constitu-
tional scholars, and especially popular constitutionalists, should tend to the constitu-
tional canon, both legal and popular.
